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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the Prohibition era, the field of searches and
seizures at sea lay dormant and was traversed by legal scholars
only on esoteric ventures. However, the influx of drugs from South
America (principally Colombia) beginning in the 1960's and the re-
* The author received his J.D. from the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill in 1975. He served as a clerk for Judge John D. Larkins, Jr., Chief
U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, from 1975-76.
From 1976-78, he was an Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division, for the East-
ern District of North Carolina. In that capacity, he served as the prosecutor in six
trials involving marijuana importation. Two of those cases resulted from the
seizure of the Lady Ellen; one trial resulted from the seizure of the Sea Crust;
and three cases arose following the seizure of the Don Elias. The stop and search
of the Lady Ellen culminated in the Fourth Circuit decisions reviewed in this
article. Since 1978, the author has been engaged in the private practice of law in
Washington, North Carolina.
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suiting war on the illegal importation of controlled substances by
the United States Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration have once again raised questions
about the propriety of stopping and searching foreign and domes-
tic vessels on the high seas. Because of the proximity of the south-
eastern United States to Latin America and the long coastline of
the states on the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic, the ma-
jority of the maritime search and seizure issues have been raised in
the District Courts and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
In the fall and winter of 1977-78, however, the seizure of two ves-
sels laden with marijuana off the North Carolina coast and the
seizure of a third vessel bound for North Carolina in the Mona
Passage' brought the issues to the fore for many practitioners in
the Eastern District of North Carolina and ultimately for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.'
The purpose of this article is to review the decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Coats' and United States v. Harper.4 Both of these cases
arose out of the stopping of the Lady Ellen, an American vessel, by
the United States Coast Guard in the Mona Passage on January
26, 1978. These cases provided the first opportunity for the Fourth
Circuit to review the authority of the Coast Guard to stop domes-
tic vessels on the high seas without probable cause or even reason-
able suspicion to believe that the vessel or crew was engaged in
illegal activity. In the Coats decision, the Court never reached the
substantive issue, finding instead that the single defendant had no
standing to contest the stopping of the Lady Ellen. In Harper, the
Court found that the stopping and search of the Lady Ellen on the
high seas was reasonable under the fourth amendment.' This arti-
1. The Mona Passage is approximately fifty miles wide and lies between the
Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.
2. The Sea Crust and six tons of marijuana were seized on Nombember 22,
1977 by the Coast Guard Cutter Gallatin over 200 miles southeast of Cape Fear,
North Carolina. The Sea Crust was a Bahamian vessel. United States v. Domin-
guez, 604 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979). The Don Elias and eleven tons of marijuana
were seized on December 9, 1977 by the Coast Guard southeast of Cape Fear. The
Don Elias was a Hondurian vessel. United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041 (4th
Cir. 1980).
3. 611 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1979). The defendant Coats was tried after the trial
of the other conspirators.
4. 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3250 (1980), reh. denied,
49 U.S.L.W. 3410 (1981).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
[Vol. 3:1
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cle will review the legislative and judicial background of the deci-
sions, analyze the decisions themselves with attention to subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions, and predict the implications for
federal law enforcement officers and drug smugglers if the novel
approach adopted by the Fourth Circuit is later affirmed.
II. RE VIEw OF FACTS
The Lady Ellen, an American vessel with a crew of three, was
proceeding northwardly on January 26, 1978, in the Mona Passage
when it was sighted by the Alert, a Coast Guard vessel which had
been dispatched to the Mona Passage from Miami. During a prior
briefing in Miami, the officers of the Alert were directed to the
Mona Passage for a surface law enforcement patrol with particular
emphasis on drug interdiction. During its patrol, the Alert was co-
operating through the Commander of the Seventh Coast Guard
District with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Cus-
toms Service in "Operation Stopgap," an effort to stem the flow of
drugs from South America. The strategy was to intercept United
States-bound ships coming from South America by concentrating
Coast Guard ships in the three major passages in the Caribbean
Sea used by north-bound vessels. At the same time that the Alert
was stationed in the Mona Passage on "pot patrol," two other
Coast Guard vessels were in the Yucatan and Westward Passages.'
It was their policy to board as many United States vessels under
250 feet in length as possible.'
The Lady Ellen was purchased in Bayou LaBatre, Alabama,
on January 4, 1978. The defendant Coats, a resident of Morehead
City, North Carolina, located the Lady Ellen, recruited the crew,
and made preparations for the trip to Colombia. The defendant
Govus, the leader of the smuggling operation, arrived in time to
give the crew final instructions for the trip and provided two suit-
cases of purchase money. Govus was also present in Colombia as
the Lady Ellen was loaded in a cove on the night of January 22,
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized."
6. See 611 F.2d at 38-9; 617 F.2d at 37.
7. The policy was based upon the inability of the Coast Guard to effectively
inspect vessels in excess of 250 feet in length on the high seas, and the likelihood
that such vessels would dock in major United States ports where a more effective
inspection could be conducted.
1981]
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1978. He instructed the captain, Breslin, to make his return voyage
to Morehead City, North Carolina, through the Mona Passage.8
On the evening of January 26, 1978, the Alert was approxi-
mately twenty miles from Cape Engano off the coast of the Domin-
ican Republic. The officer of the deck noticed a light on the hori-
zon and dispatched a helicopter to observe the vessel. The
helicopter pilot reported that the vessel was named Lady Ellen
and that its home port was in North Carolina. The Alert radioed
the Lady Ellen, directed it to stop, and a boarding party was mus-
tered. As the boarding party approached the Lady Ellen, it noted
that the home port of Wanchese, North Carolina, was painted on
the stern. During the boarding, the Coast Guard personnel de-
tected a strong odor emanating from the vessel. The commanding
officer of the boarding party identified himself and asked the cap-
tain of the Lady Ellen about the ship's points of departure and
destination. The captain turned away shaking his head and said,
"You got me. I'm coming from Colombia and I've got a load of
marijuana on board." 9 The Lady Ellen was then searched and
twenty-five tons of marijuana were found.
Prior to trial, all of the defendants moved to suppress any evi-
dence that was obtained from the stopping and search of the Lady
Ellen on the high seas on the ground that a stop and search of a
vessel without probable cause to believe that it contained contra-
band was an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment.
The defendants contended that 14 U.S.C. § 8910 (hereinafter re-
8. Supra note 6.
9. 617 F.2d at 37.
10. 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1976) reads as follows:
(a) The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections,
searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the
United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of
violations of laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, war-
rant, and petty officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the
jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries
to those on board, examine the ship's documents and papers, and examine, in-
spect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
When from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or search it appears that a
breach of the laws of the United States rendering a person liable to arrest is be-
ing, or has been committed, by any person, such person shall be arrested or, if
escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested on shore, or other
lawful and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall appear that a breach of
the laws of the United States has been committed so as to render such vessel, or
the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United
States by, such vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a
[Vol. 3:1
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ferred to as "Section 89"), which authorizes the Coast Guard to
stop and board vessels subject to United States jurisdiction in or-
der to prevent, detect, and suppress violations of the laws of the
United States, was subject to the limitations of the fourth amend-
ment. Although the statute on its face gives the Coast Guard carte
blanche authority to stop and search vessels on the high seas, the
defendants contended that the fourth amendment required that
there be probable cause to believe that a violation of United States
law was occurring aboard the vessel prior to any stop of the vessel.
III. STANDING To CONTEST THE STOP
The government alleged in both the Harper and Coats cases
that only the defendants who were aboard the Lady Ellen at the
time it was seized had standing to object to the seizure. The stand-
ing doctrine at that time was an articulation of a judicial philoso-
phy that not every defendant in a criminal case ought to be per-
mitted to complain of police misconduct, even if evidence to be
used against the defendant was the product of an illegal act. Oth-
erwise stated, the rule held that evidence would not be subject to
constitutional objections unless the defendant could demonstrate
not only a violation of the fourth amendment but also that his in-
dividual rights had been violated by the police while obtaining the
evidence." For example, a person who is aggrieved by an illegal
search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evi-
dence secured by a search of a third party's premises or property
had no standing to object to the introduction of the evidence. The
limitation that this doctrine imposed upon the class of defendants
permitted to benefit from the exclusionary rule arose in part out of
fine or penalty and if necessary to secure such fine or penalty, such vessel or such
merchandise, or both, shall be seized.
(b) The officers of the Coast Guard insofar as they are engaged, pursuant to
the authority contained in this section, in enforcing any law of the United States
shall:
(1) be deemed to be acting as agents of the particular executive department
or independent establishment charged with the administration of the particular
law; and
(2) be subject to all the rules and regulations promulgated by such depart-
ment or independent establishment with respect to the enforcement of that law.
(c)The provisions of this section are in addition to any powers conferred by
law upon such officers, and not in limitation of any powers conferred by law upon
such officers, or any other officers of the United States.
11. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963).
1981]
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an awareness that the rule often excluded relevant and reliable in-
formation and that the search for truth was often frustrated by its
application.1"
The Lady Ellen cases were tried and decided in the district
court prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rakas v. Illinois,"3
the first of three decisions which altered the concept of "standing"
to object to the introduction of illegally obtained evidence.1 4 The
government and the defendants were proceeding under the tradi-
tional concept of standing, and the decisions of the district court
are couched in the traditional terms. The Fourth Circuit had the
benefit of the Rakas opinion but not of the later two opinions. Be-
cause of the developments in the concept of standing, the Lady
Ellen decisions should be analyzed both in traditional terms and in
light of the new decisions. This article will predict how the courts
are likely to view fourth amendment objections by the various class
of defendants commonly associated with searches and seizures on
the high seas (for example, crewmembers and owners-organizers).
During the motion hearings, neither side questioned the vital-
ity of Brown v. United States."5 In that case, the Supreme Court
held that there was no standing to contest a search and seizure
when the defendants:
(a) were not'on '-he premises at the time of the contested search
and seizure;
(b) alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises;
and
(c) were not charged with an offense that included, as an essen-
tial element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evi-
dence at the time of the contested search and seizure."'
There were three persons on the Lady Ellen at the time it was
stopped: Captain Breslin and two crewmen, the defendants Harper
and Rowe.1 7 They represent the first class of defendants in the typ-
ical marijuana seizure case - the persons on board the vessel
stopped. The government conceded at all levels that the crewmen
12. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-5 (1969).
13. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
14. The other opinions were United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980)
and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980).
15. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
16. Id. at 229.
17. Captain Breslin was given immunity by the government in exchange for
his cooperation and testimony. Harper and Rowe were tried with the co-conspira-
tors arrested in North Carolina and convicted following a bench trial.
[Vol. 3:1
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had standing, presumably on the theory that the boat constituted
a "premise" and that the crewmen were "present" at the time of
the stopping. That concession, it now appears, may have been
unnecessary.
In Rakas, the petitioners were charged with armed robbery. At
their trial, the prosecution introduced into evidence a sawed-off
rifle and rifle shells which had been seized by police during a
search of an automobile in which petitioners had been passengers.
Neither petitioner owned the automobile nor asserted that he
owned the rifle or shells seized. In holding that the evidence was
admissible against the petitioners, the Court effectively overruled
the first part of the Brown decision holding that an individual's
legitimate presence on a searched premises automatically conferred
standing. Instead, the Court reasoned, the proper determination is
whether the search violated the defendant's fourth amendment
rights and in particular, his personal expectation of privacy."6
By analogy, the defendants Harper and Rowe occupied much
the same position as the petitioners in Rakas. Neither defendant
contended that he owned the boat or the marijuana stored in its
hold. They were passengers (albeit working passengers) aboard a
vessel captained by a third party. Nothing of evidentiary value was
taken from them personally, as the government introduced only
the marijuana stored below the deck. In Rakas, the evidence was
seized not from the passengers but from the glove compartment
and under the front passenger seat.' If the Rakas defendants were
unable to demonstrate an expectation of privacy in the close con-
fines of an automobile, it appears unlikely that either Harper or
Rowe had any expectation of privacy in the interior of the ship. 0
After Rakas, certainly the defendants' presence alone will not be
sufficient to allow them to question the search of certain areas of
the vessel.2'
18. 439 U.S. at 149.
19. Id. at 130.
20. After Rakas, a panel of the Fifth Circuit held that there was "no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the hold of a merchant vessel" under the circum-
stances of United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1979). A district
court reached the same conclusion prior to Rakas in United States v. May May,
470 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
21. The Fourth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1979) was issued after Rakas. The defendant, Nollie Alexander, the
captain and owner of the Sea Crust, was on board at the time of seizure. On the
standing question, the Judge Butzner noted at page 309 as follows: "Alexander,
1981]
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If the government seeks to introduce more than the marijuana
found in the hold of the vessel, the crew members may be able to
demonstrate a breach of some expectation of privacy. For example,
a crew member may well have an expectation of privacy in his per-
sonal living quarters aboard the vessel, since they are analagous to
his home or apartment on shore. If incriminating documents or
controlled substances are seized from this area, then the defendant
crew member should be able to litigate the fourth amendment
question. Likewise, crew members should be able to establish an
expectation of privacy in their work areas. For example, the cap-
tain or navigator could have a map on the bridge that would indi-
cate the destination of the vessel to be the North Carolina coast.
The value of this evidence to the prosecution in a conspiracy case
where the vessel is seized hundreds of miles from North Carolina is
obvious. The defendant should be able to demonstrate an expecta-
tion of privacy by analogizing the bridge or engine room of the ves-
sel to an office or work place on shore."s
For those persons aboard the vessel, a distinction is readily
made between the initial stopping of the vessel and its subsequent
search. In the Lady Ellen cases, the primary objection was to the
initial boarding, not to the search of the vessel, as the comments of
Captain Breslin to the boarding officers gave adequate probable
cause to search the vessel. The defendants contended instead that
if the initial stop was constitutionally faulty, the discovery of the
marijuana was a fruit of an earlier illegality and the marijuana was
excludable evidence.23 The circumstances under which domestic
vessels can now be stopped on the high seas is discussed later in
this article; however, it should be noted that even if the Supreme
Court ultimately upholds the full power of the Coast Guard to con-
duct Section 89 boardings, the subsequent searches of the vessels
are subject to scrutiny as being outside the scope necessary to ef-
fectuate the statute and enforce the laws. Hence, the crew mem-
bers' expectations of privacy in various places aboard the vessel
remain relevant.
A second category of defendants found in the Lady Ellen
on the other hand, owned the vessel and was aboard when it was searched. He
therefore had standing to move for supression of the evidence." This holding
should not be taken as authority for granting standing to any person solely be-
cause he was aboard the vessel at the time of the search. Presence and ownership
in tandem present a much stronger case for an expectation of privacy.
22. Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968).
23. 611 F.2d at 39; 617 F.2d at 37.
[Vol. 3:1
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cases, the operators and owners of the smuggling venture, has been
affected by recent Supreme Court decisions. In Brown, the Su-
preme Court afforded standing to those alleging a proprietary or
possessory interest in the premises or the evidence seized. Both the
defendants Coats and Govus alleged standing under this category.Coats alleged a proprietary interest in the Lady Ellen and its
cargo, but elected not to testify at the suppression hearing or
through an affidavit. Instead he relied upon the testimony of Cap-
tain Breslin. The evidence adduced showed that Coats recruited
Breslin for the trip, located the Lady Ellen in Bayou LaBatre, Ala-
bama, and negotiated for its purchase. Coats argued that this evi-
dence showed that he was the owner of the boat and an investor in
the operation; therefore, he should be afforded standing. Both the
district court and the Fourth Circuit rejected that argument."4
The Fourth Circuit found that Coats was actually a
subordinate of the defendant Govus and was charged with locating
a vessel and a crew. The right of possession and control of the ves-
sel shifted to Govus when he arrived in Bayou LaBatre with the
two suitcases and money and gave directions for the trip to Colom-
bia, where he once again rendezvoused with the Lady Ellen. The
clear and not surprising import of the Coats decision is that with-
out more, the mere leasing of a boat for another and outfitting it
for a voyage, will not raise an expectation of privacy aboard the
vessel when it is stopped on the high seas.
In Harper, the Fourth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide
whether each defendant had standing because it found the search
to be reasonable under the fourth amendment. It did, however,
note that only some, of the defendants actually had standing. 26 In
particular, the Court found that Govus had the right of possession
and control of the Lady Ellen, bringing him within the second of
24. 611 F.2d at 40.
25. United States v. Warren, 550 F.2d 219, 228 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
26. The majority of the defendants were arrested at Back Creek in Craven
County, North Carolina. After the Lady Ellen was boarded, Captain Breslin and
the crew agreed to cooperate in a "controlled drop" in North Carolina, the origi-
nal destination. Unbeknownst to the other conspirators, the Coast Guard ferried
the Lady Ellen to North Carolina, placed the original crew back aboard, and
surveilled it as it proceeded through the Beaufort Inlet and northward to Back
Creek. As the Lady Ellen was being unloaded, federal and state officers converged
on the area, reseizing the marijuana and arresting many of the ultimate
defendants.
19811
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the Brown criteria; that is, a possessory interest in the premises. In
addition, Govus had alleged at the trial court a proprietary interest
in the marijuana itself. It now appears in light of recent cases dis-
cussed below that the latter allegation alone would not have been
enough to confer standing.
In Rawlings v. Kentucky,27 the Supreme Court considered the
search of a pocketbook which resulted in the seizure of a quantity
of illegal drugs. Rawlings had placed the drugs in a companion's
pocketbook prior to the arrival of the police. Nevertheless, Rawl-
ings contended that he should be allowed to challenge the search
because he claimed ownership of the drugs in the pocketbook. In
rejecting this claim, the Court noted that it had in Rakas "emphat-
ically rejected the notion that 'arcane' concepts of property law
ought to control the ability to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. ' 28 Although ownership of the drugs may be a factor,
the pivotal inquiry after Rawlings was once more whether the de-
fendant had any expectation of privacy in the place searched. After
this decision, it is unlikely that there will be any successful chal-
lenges to searches of vessels by persons not on the vessel at the
time of the search who merely allege ownership of the contraband
aboard.29
The Rawlings decision does however, leave open the possibil-
ity that the defendant will be able to establish an expectation of
privacy in a vessel on the high seas by showing a possessory or
ownership interest in the vessel itself as opposed to its cargo. For
example, the Fourth Circuit found that Govus had the "right of
possession and control of the vessel."80 That showing may continue
to be sufficient to demonstrate an expectation of privacy aboard
the vessel; however, in light of the Supreme Court's reevaluation of
the "standing" concept as enunciated in Brown, the possessory or
proprietary interest in the premises standard as an independent
grounds for standing may be short-lived. A person who sends his
vessel outside the country with other persons aboard on a voyage
of several thousand miles, including a stop in a foreign country,
27. 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980).
28. Id. at 2562.
29. In United States v. Jackson, 585 F.2d 653, 656-59 (4th Cir. 1978), the
Court anticipated the Rawlings decision and held that an allegation of a "proprie-
tary or possessory" interest in the thing seized would not by itself confer stand-
ing. The Court relied upon United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976).
30. 611 F.2d at 40.
[Vol. 3:1
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arguably has little expectation of personal privacy when the vessel
is stopped hundreds of miles from where he is. The evidence in
Coats and Harper indicated that not only was Govus at Bayou
LaBatre when the vessel left the United States; he was also in Co-
lumbia for the loading, and was later in North Carolina awaiting
its arrival at Back Creek. Govus also gave Breslin the exclusive di-
rections for the voyage. 1 Since Govus took such an active role in
guiding and meeting the Lady Ellen, he was able to advance a
stronger claim of expectation of privacy than an owner-organizer
who remained in the United States and whose only contact with
the vessel was through subordinates.
The defendants in the Lady Ellen cases were convicted only of
conspiracy to import marijuana.32 At the time it was not a violation
of United States law to possess marijuana aboard an American ves-
sel on the high seas, and the government was forced to rely upon
the conspiracy violation. Nevertheless, the defendants sought to
establish standing by expanding upon the third criteria in the
Brown decision, an indictment that alleges an offense in which pos-
session of the item seized is an essential element. The defendants
argued that the indictment alleged that they all
shared in a common venture that had a proprietary or possessory
interest in the Lady Ellen and the evidence found in the search
of her. As business partners all had interests in the property be-
longing to the joint venture. Although they might share unequally
in the property, they had in common a reasonable expectation of
privacy in it regardless of whether they were nominal title
holders.33
In effect, the defendants were contending that all members of a
conspiracy had standing.
As noted earlier, neither side questioned at the time the vital-
ity of Brown; nor did either party challenge the rule of Jones v.
United States.3 4 Both cases held that a defendant charged with a
crime that includes possession of the seized item as an essential
element has automatic standing to contest its seizure. This excep-
tion to the requirement that each defendant affirmatively establish
standing was based in part upon the unwillingness of the Supreme
31. Id.
32. 611 F.2d at 37-8; 617 F.2d at 35.
33. Brief for Appellant at 62, United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3250 (1980), reh. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3410 (1981).
34. 326 U.S. 257 (1970).
19811
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Court to allow the government to allege the contradictory positions
that the defendant possessed the seized goods for purposes of
criminal liability, while simultaneously alleging that he did not
possess them for purposes of claiming the protections of the fourth
amendment.-
The government instead argued that the Jones rule was inap-
plicable because the defendants were not charged with possession
of marijuana but rather with conspiracy to import marijuana, and
that possession of marijuana was not an essential element of the
conspiracy charge. Although the Fourth Circuit never decided the
standing issue in the Harper decision, the government's argument
was well supported by an earlier Fourth Circuit decision.3 5
On the same day that it rendered the Rawlings decision, the
Supreme Court decided the case of United States v. Salvucci." In
that case, Jones and the third prong of Brown were specifically
overruled and the automatic standing doctrine for possessory of-
fenses was laid to rest. The Supreme Court considered in Salvucci
the search of one of the defendant's mother's rented apartment
during which stolen mail matter was recovered. The defendants,
charged with possession of stolen mail, questioned the sufficiency
of the affidavit for the warrant. The Supreme Court held that pos-
session would still be considered but declined "to use possession of
a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of
the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
searched.3 7
This decision had little effect on searches and seizures on the
high seas at the time. It was not a violation of any criminal statute
for a United States citizen to possess controlled substances aboard
a domestic vessel on the high seas. 8 However, on September 15,
1980, President Carter signed into law an amendment to the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Control and Prevention Act of 1970 which
35. In United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d .1020, 1026 (4th Cir. 1978), the
Court held that the defendant charged with conspiracy to manufacture and pos-
sess a controlled substance and traveling in interstate commerce in aid of a racke-
teering enterprise had no standing to contest the validity of the seizure of the
controlled substances because possession of the items seized was not an essential
element of the offenses charged.
36. 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).
37. Id. at 2553.
38. The high seas lie seaward of the territorial sea which extends three miles
from the actual coast. Convention on the High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, art. 2, 13
U.S.T. 2312, 2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
[Vol. 3:1
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol3/iss1/1
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
made it unlawful for any person on board a United States vessel or
any vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the
high seas to possess a controlled substance with intent to dis-
tribute. The amendment also made it unlawful for a United States
citizen to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance
aboard any vessel. 9
Following the decisions in Coats and Harper and the recent
Supreme Court pronouncements, it is apparent that fewer and
fewer defendants are going to be able to contest stops and searches
on the high seas. The former categories which gave "automatic
standing" have been abrogated and the burden is now on each de-
fendant to establish an expectation of privacy in the area searched.
There will apparently be no ready categories but rather an ad hoc
decision in each case as to whether there is an expectation of pri-
vacy. In light of the Supreme Court's clear trend to restrict the
"exclusionary rule," it is likely that the burden will indeed be a
tough one. The persons who seem to be in the best position are the
owners of the boats and their cargos. The owner of the vessel is
most often the organizer or at least the financial backer. The
emerging trend raises the spectre that attorneys, both defense and
prosecution, have criticized - that the party most culpable may be
the only party with an expectation of privacy and who escapes
prosecution, while those with lesser roles are not allowed the bene-
fits of the exclusionary rule.
In the 1980 amendment, Congress gave federal prosecutors a
powerful weapon in their apparently never-ending battle with the
smugglers.40 The Salvucci decision gave added force to the new
39. Act of Sept. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-350, [19801 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 94 Stat. 1159 (to be codified in 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a), (b) ).
40. The following comments appeared in the Narcotics Newsletter, Vol. II,
No. 9 (September, 1980), a publication of the Criminal Division of the United
States Department of Justice:
The measure will fill a void existing in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act which fails to proscribe possession of con-
trolled substances on the high seas. In the past, controlled substance of-
fenders apprehended on the high seas have been prosecuted for unlaw-
fully conspiring or attempting to import controlled substances. Such
prosecutions have involved troublesome evidentiary difficulties. The
measure should make it much easier to prosecute the officers and crews
of such vessels as well as other individuals involved in drug smuggling
operations.
Federal prosecutors in the Eastern District wasted no time in implementing the
new statute. The grand jury returned indictments on January 6, 1981 under ,the
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statute. Prior to the decision, each person charged under the new
statute would have had "automatic standing." That is no longer
the case, inasmuch as each defendant will now have to demon-
strate some measure of expectation of privacy in the area searched
or item seized. As noted above, that task has become increasingly
difficult.
IV. REASONABLENESS OF THE STOP
A. STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The primary statutory source of authority for searches and
seizures of domestic vessels on the high seas is 14 U.S.C. § 89(a),41
which reads in part as follows:
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections,
searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over
which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, de-
tection, and suppression of violations of the laws of the United
States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty of-
ficers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the
jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States,
address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's docu-
ments and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel
and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
This statute and its antecedents are almost as old as the coun-
try itself. The country's first customs statute was enacted in 1789,
and granted customs officials "full power and authority" to enter
and search "any ship or vessel, in which they have reason to sus-
pect goods, wares, or merchandise subject to duty shall be con-
cealed ..."
The Revenue Cutter Service was established the following
statute against four crewmen of the Terry and Jo which was seized thirty-eight
miles off the North Carolina coast. United States v. Bradley, No. 81-1-CR-7
(E.D.N.C., filed Jan. 6, 1981).
41. Supra note 10.
42. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29. This act was passed by the same
Congress that proposed the fourth amendment. The historical importance of this
is noted in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886):
As this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adop-
tion the original amendments to the constitution, it is clear that the
members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind
as "unreasonable" and they were not embraced within the prohibition of
the amendment.
See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977).
[Vol. 3:1
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol3/iss1/1
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
year.4 Section 31 of that act provided as follows:
That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors,
inspectors and officers of the revenue cutters to go on board of
ships or vessels in any part of the United States or within four
leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the United States,
whether in or out of their respective districts, for the purposes of
demanding the manifests aforesaid, and of examining and search-
ing the said ships or vessels; and the said officers respectively
shall have free access to the cabin, and every other part of the
ship or vessel."
This authority remained unchanged until 1866, when in an
Act "to further prevent smuggling and for other purposes," Con-
gress eliminated the previous language of the customs statutes,
(that is, "within four leagues of the coast hereof if bound to the
United States") and broadened the explicit law enforcement au-
thority of the Revenue Cutter Service. 45 The Coast Guard was cre-
ated in 1915 to replace the Revenue Cutter Service and the Life-
Saving Service of the Treasury." At that time, the duties and pow-
ers previously exercised by the Revenue Cutter Service were trans-
ferred to the Coast Guard.47
B. PRIOR DECISIONS CONSTRUING SECTION 89
The constitutional limitations of Section 89 and the ability of
the Coast Guard to search American vessels on the high seas were
explained by two courts of appeal prior to the Harper decision.
The Fifth Circuit had repeatedly held that the Coast Guard has
plenary power to stop and board any American flag vessel any-
where on the high seas in the complete absence of probable cause
or any particularized suspicion of criminal activity. In the United
States v. Warren," the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc considered the
stopping of a shrimp boat in the Windward Passage 700 miles from
the United States. The Court reversed an earlier panel decision,
finding instead that Coast Guard personnel may conduct documen-
43. Ch. 35, § 62, 1 Stat. 175 (1790).
44. Ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164 (1790).
45. Ch. 301, § 201, 14 Stat. 178 (1866).
46. Act of January 28, 1915, Ch. 20, 38 Stat. 800.
47. An exhaustive review of the historical background of Section 89 is found
in Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51
(1977).
48. 550 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd 578 F.2d 1058 (1978).
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tation and safety inspections and, if during the course of such an
inspection, circumstances arise that generate probable cause to be-
lieve that a crime is being committed, the Coast Guard may con-
duct searches, seize evidence, and make arrests. The Fifth Circuit
continued to sustain the plenary authority of the Coast Guard,"
but it has indicated in a more recent opinion that it may not con-
done searches under the safety and documentation label if the la-
bel is merely a blatant pretext for a search to uncover
contraband.50
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in United States v.
Piner,'51 a case involving the Coast Guard search of a vessel in the
San Francisco Bay. Despite the authority of Section 89(a), the
Court held that the random stop and boarding of a vessel after
dark for safety and registration inspection without cause to suspect
noncompliance was not justified by the governmental need to en-
force, compliance with safety regulations, and constituted a viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. The Ninth Circuit further held that
a stop after dark must be for cause, requiring at least a reasonable
and articulable suspicion of noncompliance, or must be conducted
under administrative standards so drafted that the decision to
search is not left to the sole discretion of the Coast Guard officer."5
Although the Ninth Circuit is apparently the first court to engraft
a reasonable suspicion requirement on Section 89, its application
to high seas searches may be limited. Significantly, the search in
that case was conducted in the internal waters of the United States
and the Court emphasized that the search was defective only be-
cause it was conducted after dark.53
C. ANALYSIS BY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
The Fourth Circuit held in Harper that the stop and boarding
of the Lady Ellen "was lawful, absent any particularized suspicion
of criminal activity aboard, because it was undertaken as a system-
49. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1075 (5th Cir. 1980) (dictum);
United States v. Erwin, 602 F.2d 1183, 1184 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1071 (1980).
50. United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1980); but see
United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 670 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3700 (1981).
51. 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979), afl'g 452 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
52. Id. at 361.
53. Id.
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atic 'border' stop and inquiry."'" Justice Hall, writing for the
panel, noted that Section 89(a) by its terms gave the Coast Guard
plenary authority to stop and board vessels on the high seas. He
also noted that the Fifth Circuit in Warren held that Section 89
authorized discretionary boardings of American vessels on the high
seas without particularized suspicion about criminal activities
aboard to conduct random safety and documentary inspections,
and to look for obvious customs and narcotics violations.55
The stop and boarding of the Lady Ellen was found to be rea-
sonable for four reasons. First, the systematic nature of the board-
ings did not allow for the "will and whim" of the officers; the
boarding arose out of a coordinated effort by several government
agencies to stop all American flag ships which passed the maritime
checkpoint in a sea lane known for its smuggling traffic."
Secondly, there was a lowered expectation of privacy aboard
the Lady Ellen because it was a commercial vessel sailing on the
high seas. Relaxed fourth amendment standards are reasonable for
industries which are historically subject to close supervision and
inspection. Commercial shipping, like the liquor and firearms in-
dustries, has such a history of government regulation that there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy within the industry.67
Thirdly, there are great practical difficulties in policing Ameri-
can vessels. A ship is easily lost on the seas and has little contact
with government vessels. The mobility and anonymity of the boat
require that the government exercise control when there is an
opportunity.
To require some particularized suspicion concerning individual
vessels in order to carry out a systematic inspection of all vessels
in some area of the sea would encourage outright flaunting of the
navigation, safety and administrative laws of the United States at
the expense of our government's sovereign obligation under inter-
national law to police its flag ships."
Finally, the stopping of the Lady Ellen was not unlike road-
side truck weigh-stations and inspection points which the Supreme
Court had found to be reasonable intrusions on privacy interests.59
54. 617 F.2d at 37.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 38.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 39.
59. Id., citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
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In the collective mind of the panel, all of these factors coa-
lesced to make the search on the high seas a "special case" and in
this instance at least, a reasonable police practice.6 0
D. REVIEW OF BORDER SEARCH LAW
An analysis of the Harper decision begins of necessity with a
review of the "border search" exception to the warrant require-
ment: all routine searches which are conducted at the border are
per se reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
There is no requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion
of illegal activity. This rule is a longstanding, historically recog-
nized exception to the fourth amendment's general principle that a
warrant be obtained prior to a search. The exception is grounded
in the right of a sovereign to control, subject to constitutional re-
straints, who and what may cross its borders. It is also based upon
the lowered levels of expectation of privacy at the border as inter-
national travelers are generally aware of the procedures established
for border security and knowingly subject themselves to those pro-
cedures by crossing the border.61
During the 1970's, the Supreme Court recognized in a series of
cases that certain searches, although not occurring at the actual
border, may nevertheless come under the border search umbrella.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,62 the Court considered the
stopping and search of an automobile by a roving patrol on a Cali-
fornia road that at all points lay at least twenty miles north of the
Mexican border. The search by the Border Patrol was authorized
by a federal statute providing for warrantless searches of
automobiles and other conveyances "within a reasonable distance
from any external boundary of the United States."" The Court,
however, held that any search of a vehicle under the statute by a
roving patrol away from the border or its functional equivalent
would have to be based upon probable cause or consent."
Although it did so by dictum, the Almeida-Sanchez Court
solidifed the concept of the "functional equivalent" of the border
- places away from the actual border that have many of the char-
60. Id. at 39.
61. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
62. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
63. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1976).
64. 413 U.S. at 273.
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acteristics of the border and where it is reasonable to allow
searches without probable cause to believe that a vehicle is being
used to commit a crime. Examples given by the Court included an
established station near the border or a point marking the conflu-
ence of two or more roads that extend from the border. Another
example suggested was an inland airport where nonstop intena-
tional flights arrive."'
In its later decisions, the Supreme Court delineated the stan-
dards for detentions and searches near the border but at places
that did not qualify as the functional equivalent of the border. A
roving patrol away from the border may conduct brief investigative
stops of a vehicle (as opposed to full searches) only when there is a
reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle may contain illegal
aliens. 66 The Court in United States v. Ortiz6 7 extended the rule of
Almeida-Sanchez and required probable cause for a full search of
a vehicle at a fixed checkpoint away from the border. However, a
vehicle may be stopped for brief questioning routinely conducted
at a permanent checkpoint. Any further detention or search at the
checkpoint must be based upon consent or probable cause. The
different standards for brief investigatory stops at fixed check-
points as opposed to roving patrols were not rationalized by any
difference in the intrusiveness of the stop, but rather because the
generation of "concern or even fright on the part of lawful trav-
elers" is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint.68
Because of their proximity to Mexico and the Latin American
sources of illegal aliens and drugs, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
have been primarily responsible for the development of the rules
relating to border searches. However, even prior to the Harper de-
cision, the Fourth Circuit had developed a modest body of border
search law, most of it of recent vintage. In United States v. Mc-
Glone,"9 the Court found that a warrantless search of a longshore-
man's automobile inside a fenced dock area for pilfered imported
goods was reasonable, even though there was no showing that the
custodian of the automobile had crossed the border. Likewise, in
65. Id. at 272-73.
66. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); see also
United States v. Cortez, 49 U.S.L.W. 4099 (1981).
67. 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976).
68. 422 U.S. at 894-95; see also 428 U.S. at 558.
69. 394 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1968).
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United States v. Gallagher,7 the defendant shipped a Volkswagen
camper from Europe to Baltimore, where it was taken under cus-
toms custody and seal to Norfolk, Virginia. Prior to releasing the
camper to the defendant, customs officials searched it without a
warrant and found hashish. The Fourth Circuit found that the
dock area constituted the border, that the search was therefore
reasonable under the fourth amendment, and that the defendant
conceded the searching officers had "reasonable cause to suspect" a
violation of law as required by 19 U.S.C. § 482. 7' Finally, in United
States v. Milroy,7' the Court upheld the warrantless search of en-
velopes in San Francisco that were mailed at an APO postal unit
as a valid border search.
The Fourth Circuit was first presented with an "extended bor-
der search" in United States v. Bilir." In that case, agents
searched without a warrant a suitcase carried by one of the defen-
dants in a railroad station and discovered a large quantity of her-
oin. Although the search was made three to four miles from the
actual border and seven hours after the observed border crossing
(suspect left ship in Baltimore harbor), the Court found that the
search was justifiable as an extended border search primarily be-
cause the suspects had been under practically continuous surveil-
lance in the interval between the search and the border crossing.
The Court summarized the extended border search doctrine as
follows:
It holds that some searches by customs officials, although con-
70. 557 F.2d 1041 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977).
71. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1976) reads as follows:
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop,
search, and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehi-
cle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchan-
dise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States
in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or
by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and to search any trunk or
envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect
there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law; and if any such officer
or other person so authorized shall find any merchandise on or about any such
vehicle, beast, or person, or in any such trunk or envelope, which he shall have
reasonable cause to believe is subject to duty, or to have been unlawfully intro-
duced into the United States, whether by the person in possession or charge, or
by, in, or upon such vehicle, beast, or otherwise, he shall seize and secure the
same for trial.
72. 538 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976).
73. 592 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 3:1
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol3/iss1/1
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ducted at points physically away from an actual border and re-
moved in time from the precise item of importation, may never-
theless be treated as border searches. (citation omitted) The test
of validity is one of reasonableness under the circumstances. For
this no rigid formula can be prescribed. Time and distance factors
may be of importance, but are not alone decisive. Ultimately the
question is simply whether under all the circumstances - time
and distance factors included - the customs officials had a rea-
sonable basis for the suspicion leading to the search away from
the actual border (emphasis added).74
Although Judge Phillips expressed considerable confusion in
the opinion as to whether there was a difference between "exten-
sions of the border" and the "functional equivalent of the bor-
der, 7 5 it is clear from the opinion that unless the search is actually
conducted at the border or its functional equivalent, it must be
based upon some reasonable suspicion that material recently ille-
gally imported would be disclosed. (It is likewise apparent that the
Court's requirement of reasonable suspicion was based upon a con-
stitutional standard in addition to the requirement of 19 U.S.C. §
482).
The Bilir Court also anticipated the issues that would be
raised in the Harper opinion. The Court noted that 19 U.S.C. §
482 authorized a search of any trunk or envelope "wherever
found," but opined that the "statute's literal assertion of an unlim-
ited geographical and temporal extension of border search author-
ity . . . is assuredly subject to ultimate constitutional con-
straints." 6 Later the Bilir Court noted that the Supreme Court
still considers open the question of the geographical limits to
which the border search authority embodied in such statutes as 19
U.S.C. § 482 may constitutionally be taken.7
E. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION"
In the Harper opinion, the Fourth Circuit did not decide the
broad issue advanced by the defendants, that is, whether the Coast
Guard may stop and board American ships without probable cause
or even reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Instead, the
Court decided only that upon the specific facts of the case, both'
74. Id. at 740.
75. Id. at 742, nn. 11 & 12.
76. Id. at 739, n. 6.
77. Id. at 742, n. 13.
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the stop and search of the Lady Ellen were reasonable without any
particularized suspicion. Not only does the opinion leave many
questions unanswered; it also raises new questions about the scope
of the "border search" exception to the requirement that searches
and seizures be based upon probable cause.
The Fourth Circuit held that the Harper search was reasona-
ble "because it was undertaken as a systematic 'border' stop and
inquiry. " 78 The government had indeed argued that the stop was
under the border search umbrella, contending that the Mona Pas-
sage was the "functional equivalent of the border." It asked the
Court to give the term "border" a geographically flexible meaning
and to extend it to the well-defined sea lane, even though it was
outside the continental United States and 800 miles from the
North Carolina coast. It argued that the shipping lanes from Co-
lombia were easy to identify and that the Coast Guard had placed
ships in the three narrow passages in the Caribbean because it
knew that marijuana-laden vessels traversed them on the way to
the United States. It further argued that the chances of detecting
marijuana headed for the United States were considerably greater
at these "checkpoints" than would be the case along the actual
border. Therefore, according to the government, the passages be-
came the functional equivalent of the border or a fixed checkpoint
as approved in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,7 9 even though
they are located outside the continental United States. The gov-
ernment advanced no direct authority for this extension of the bor-
der outside the territorial limits, but relied upon the Bilir opinion
that refused to lay down any hard and fast rules for extended bor-
der searches.80
The language of the opinion produces doubt as to whether the
Fourth Circuit actually considered this to be a border search. In
the first place, it chose to place the term "border" in quotation
marks, a recognition perhaps that it was in some respects like a
border search but without actually being one. Secondly, the Court
noted that the search on the high seas is a special case, "in much
the same sense that a border search is." 8' This is a further indica-
tion that the Court was not trying to place the stop directly in the
78. 617. F.2d at 37.
79. Supra note 67.
80. Brief for Appellee at 38-9, United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3250 (1980), reh. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3410 (1981).
81. 617 F.2d at 39.
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border search pigeon hole.
Furthermore, the stop of the Lady Ellen does not fall into the
definitions of extended border searches developed by the Supreme
Court and the Fourth Circuit. If the Fourth Circuit has adopted
the government's "convex-concave" approach to border searches, it
is the first court to justify a search outside the territorial waters of
the United States as an extended border search when there is no
reason to believe there has been a recent crossing of the interna-
tional border. Although numerous decisions note that border
searches may be conducted at places other than the actual border,
all of the searches occurred to the interior of the border and there
is no discussion of whether the border may be extended outward.
In the overview of border search law as developed by the Su-
preme Court and Fourth Circuit, it was noted that there must be
at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before a car is
stopped unless the stop occurs at the actual border, its functional
equivalent, or at a permanent checkpoint. There is no requirement
of any suspicion at the functional equivalent or permanent check-
point, but at the checkpoint, a vehicle may be stopped only for
brief questioning routinely conducted there. Since the Harper
opinion does not discuss the stopping of the vessel in traditional
terms, it is not clear whether the Fourth Circuit considered the
stop as coming within the internal border search categories of
functional equivalent or fixed checkpoint; however, at one point in
the decision, the Court noted that the stop "was conducted at a
checkpoint in waters well known as sea lanes for such clandestine
operations."' This may be an indication that the Court considered
the positioning of the Alert in the Mona Passage to be the estab-
lishment of a fixed checkpoint as discussed in Martinez-Fuerte.
In that opinion, the Supreme Court held that the maintenance
of a traffic-checking program in the nation's interior on important
highways was necessary because the flow of illegal aliens could not
be controlled effectively at the border. The Court approved the
brief stopping of automobiles at these permanent checkpoints for
questioning and visual inspection without any individualized suspi-
cion of wrongdoing; however, it held there could be no full search
of the car at these checkpoints unless probable cause was
developed. 8
Although the Fourth Circuit did not directly analogize the
82. Id. at 38.
83. 428 U.S. at 566-67.
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facts of the Harper case to the roadside checkpoint, it discussed
the same factors that justified the stop at the checkpoints removed
from the border. For example, the position of the Alert was fixed
in the Mona Passage and all vessels under 250 feet in length were
boarded, thus reducing the discretion of the officers aboard. Fur-
ther, the mere stopping and boarding of the vessel for the produc-
tion of documents and a brief inquiry pose a minimal intrusion on
privacy interests. Also, the establishment of checkpoints on the
high seas is necessary, since it is impossible to control the flow of
drugs by screening each ship at the border. Finally, the Fourth Cir-
cuit directly compared the Alert to a roadside inspection point.
Although the comparison of the stop of the Lady Ellen to the
roadside checkpoint is appealing, there are significant differences
between the two. In the first place, the checkpoint inspection on a
major highway may be accomplished by stopping the vehicle and
an officer making a brief inquiry and visual search of the interior
of the car. This process averaged five minutes at the San Clemente,
California, checkpoint." On the other hand, the stopping of the
Lady Ellen was much more intrusive than a stop at the highway
checkpoint. The Lady Ellen was detected by radar from a distance
of many miles and a helicopter was dispatched to identify the ves-
sel. The helicopter pilot shone a bright light over the deck and de-
termined the name, registry and home port of the vessel. Radio
contact was then established between the ship and the Lady Ellen
was directed to "heave to." The stop of the Lady Ellen illustrates
the differences between the highway checkpoint and the maritime
checkpoint; the vessels to be checked do not pass directly by the
Coast Guard vessel and must be hailed from a distance or sought
out. It is not uncommon for the complete process to last over an
hour or even as much as three hours, depending on the distances
included and the weather conditions. Further, as practiced by the
Coast Guard, the stop involves more than a direction to stop, to
allow the Coast Guard to dispatch a helicopter or come closer to
make observations, and to question the captain of the vessel by
radio or by hailing from close distances. The Coast Guard instead
actually comes aboard the vessel with an armed boarding party.
The second significant difference is the permanency of the
highway checkpoint. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court
noted that the checkpoint was permanent in place and in operation
84. Id. at 551.
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seventy percent of the time.85 The assignment of the Alert to the
Mona Passage by no means created a permanent checkpoint. Its
assignment there was limited, and there was no evidence that the
Coast Guard maintained a vessel in the Passage on a permanent
basis. Rather, the Alert was there only as a part of "Operation
Stopgap." Further, the Alert was not stationed at a fixed point in
the fifty mile wide Mona Passage; instead, it roamed at will
throughout the passage in much the same manner as the roving
patrols condemned in Almedia-Sanchez. Moreover, the Alert was
incapable of stopping all of the ships steaming through the Mona
Passage because of its size and the lack of a uniform route through
the passage.
The other traditional exception to the probable cause require-
ment associated with the searches away from the border is that
searches conducted at the functional equivalent of the border do
not require probable cause. The Mona Passage would not appear,
however, to qualify as a functional equivalent of the border.
The lower federal courts have developed three factors to de-
termine whether checkpoints near an international border are the
functional equivalents of border searches. 86 These factors have as-
sumed that the search was inside the international border. The
first factor is the relative permanence of the checkpoint; that is,
does it function like a permanent border checkpoint or like a rov-
ing patrol? As discussed above, the voyage of the Alert was roving
in nature. The second factor is the relatively minimal interruption
of purely domestic traffic; that is, the checkpoint should not inter-
cept anything approaching a majority of domestic traffic. The
Alert met this criterion by stopping only American vessels; how-
ever, because of the distance from the border, the Alert could not
determine whether the American flag vessels were bound for do-
mestic or foreign ports. There was no evidence presented by the
government that would indicate the percentage of north bound
American flag vessels in the passage that were bound for the
United States. The third criterion is the capability to monitor por-
tions of international traffic not otherwise practically controllable.
It appears that the government could overcome this hurdle since
85. Id. at 554.
86. United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 542 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1976); see also
United States v. Luddington, 589 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936
(1979); United States v. Nelums, 589 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
910 (1979); United States v. Renya, 572 F.2d 515 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
871 (1978).
1981]
25
Gaskins: The Fourth Circuit and the Fourth Amendment: Removing the High fr
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
there is no effective way to monitor all incoming ships at the actual
border. Despite the similarities, the checkpoint established by the
Coast Guard failed to meet the criteria established for internal
functional equivalents of the border.
The determination by the Fourth Circuit that the stop of the
Lady Ellen was a valid border search raises numerous questions,
the answers to which are not obvious. The first question is whether
the border search exception is limited to searches conducted only
in the three major passages in the Caribbean, or whether there are
other places outside the border where border searches may be con-
ducted. The only requirements intimated by the Court in Harper
were that a checkpoint be established "in waters well known as sea
lanes for such clandestine operations" and that it be conducted in
a "well-traveled sea lane. '87 Under this criteria, it would appear
that the Coast Guard could isolate an area on the Colombian coast
which was known for loading American vessels with marijuana and
post enough vessels in international waters just outside the border
to intercept all outgoing American vessels. The stopping and
boarding should qualify as a border search even though.it is fur-
ther from the United States. If a border search could be conducted
800 miles from the actual border, there is no reason why a border
search could not be conducted anywhere in international waters.
Secondly, the question of what constitutes a maritime check-
point remains subject to elucidation. How long does a boat have to
be in a specified area before it becomes a checkpoint? What is the
size of the area that the boat can patrol? Is it limited to a rela-
tively narrow passage such as the Mona Passage or may the Coast
Guard select a sea lane on the open seas? Do all American flag
vessels that are detected in the area of surveillance have to be
stopped and boarded? May American vessels that are sailing away
from the mainland be stopped as well as those sailing in the gen-
eral direction of the mainland? And lastly, are actual boardings
always justified or are there situations when the intrusion must ini-
tially be limited to observations from other vessels and radio
contact?
After this discussion of the Fourth Circuit's handling of the
Lady Ellen matter, it may be well to remember the admonition of
Judge Butzner in United States v. McGlone:
The numerous cases dealing with "border searches" uniformly
87. 617 F.2d at 38-9.
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recognize that validity of a search and seizure made by a customs
officer does not depend simply upon whether it can be categorized
as a "border search." The term is simply descriptive. Regardless
of its label, the standard for search by customs, as for any search,
is the constitutional requirement of reasonableness ... 88
There is no question that the Fourth Circuit found the stop of
the Lady Ellen to be reasonable. That conclusion is supported by
the many factors that the Court cited as coalescing "to make the
search on the high seas a special case." As noted above, the appel-
lation given to the stop is not only novel but also raises serious
questions about its later application. Written opinions in criminal
cases are intended not only to be notice to the litigants in that case
but are also intended to be a guide for police and defendants in the
future. Although the term "border" is nothing more than a label, it
does provide established guidelines for determination of reasona-
bleness, at least for searches within or at the border. By finding
that a border search can be conducted on the high seas, the Fourth
Circuit has utilized a descriptive term, the guidelines for which do
not always readily fit searches on the high seas.
In any event, it is clear that the Fourth Circuit did not adopt
wholesale the position of the Fifth Circuit. It stopped short of
holding that the Coast Guard had unbridled discretion in stopping,
boarding, and searching American vessels under Section 89(a). In-
stead, it apparently established a new category of "external border
searches," albeit a category whose parameters are not well-defined.
V. CONCLUSION
The task of the attorney defending the smuggler whose boat is
seized on the high seas has indeed been toughened by the Supreme
Court and the Fourth Circuit. Not only may his client be fore-
closed from litigating the validity of the seizure of the marijuana-
laden vessel; he may find, if he is able to pass the initial hurdle,
that the courts will sustain the reasonableness of the search itself.
It has long been the feeling of many defense attorneys that the
fourth amendment assumes different dimensions in drug cases and
the breadth of its protection shrinks in proportion to the quantity
of drugs involved. The recent rulings by the Supreme Court re-
stricting the scope of the fourth amendment have merely fueled
the claims that the protections of the fourth amendment are being
88. 394 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1968).
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sacrificed to combat a law enforcement problem of great
magnitude.
The willingness of the Fourth Circuit in Harper to fashion a
new exception to the requirement of probable cause is a part of
that trend. In its decision in Bilir, the Fourth Circuit stated that
there were ultimate geographic limitations on border searches. Af-
ter the Harper decision, the defense attorney must ask himself if
there are in fact any geographic limitations on the border search
authority or any circumstances under which a search on the high
seas will be unreasonable in the Fourth Circuit.
28
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol3/iss1/1
